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INDIAN LAW
CHARLES N. ESTES, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

A number of significant cases in the field of Indian law were decided during the Survey year by the New Mexico federal district
court and by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on appeal from the
district court. Four of the cases reviewed here involved the perennial
conflict over jurisdiction within Indian reservations between the
state, on the one hand, and the tribes and federal government on the
other. The Tenth Circuit upheld the jurisdiction of state courts to adjudicate Indian water rights' and the state's power to impose its
gross receipts tax on contractors engaged in construction on Indian
lands.2 Conversely, the court of appeals held state game and fish laws
to be inapplicable within Indian reservations 3 and enjoined enforcement of a writ of garnishment issued by a state magistrate court
against wages earned by an Indian on a reservation.4 In another jurisdictional case, the Tenth Circuit upheld the power of a tribe to impose a severance tax on oil and gas producers on its reservation. 5
Two district court decisions are discussed. In JicarillaApache Tribe
v. Supron Energy Corp.,6 the tribe alleged both antitrust and common law lease violations by oil and gas lessees on its lands, but the
lessees prevailed on most issues. In JicarillaApache Tribe v. United
States,' the tribe successfully sued the Secretary of the Interior to
prevent storage of water from the San Juan-Chama Project in Elephant Butte Reservoir, alleging that diversion of the water adversely
affected a tribal fishery on the Navajo River.8
In the final case reviewed in this article,9 the Tenth Circuit held
*Assistant City Attorney, City of Albuquerque, New Mexico. Former Assistant United
States Attorney for the District of New Mexico.
1. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 601 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 995 (1979).
2. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 625 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1980).
3. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724 (1980).
4. Joev. Marcum, 621 F.2d 358 (10th Cit. 1980).
5. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W.
3208 (No. 80-11, Oct. 7, 1980).
6. 479 F. Supp. 536 (D.N.M. 1979).
7. No. 75-742-P (D.N.M., filed May 8, 1980).
8. Id. This water was committed by contract to the City of Albuquerque.
9. United Statesv. Pino, 606 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1979).
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that any state law crime may be the basis of a lesser included offense
committed by an Indian on an Indian reservation based upon an interpretation of the United States Code. I0
I. STATE JURISDICTION-WATER RIGHTS
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States. 1' In this case the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by
the tribe to adjudicate all water rights on the Navajo River in northern New Mexico.' 2 In 1975, the New Mexico State Engineer had
filed an action in state court in San Juan County to adjudicate water
rights on the San Juan River' ' and the Jicarilla Tribe subsequently
filed this case in federal district court. The tribe argued that the rights
to the Navajo River could be adjudicated separately in federal proceeding because that river is physically a separate part of the San Juan
system. The United States also was joined as a defendant in the tribe's
action. 14
The tribe asserted that its federal court suit was not foreclosed by
the pendency of an adjudication in state court covering the same geographic area because the state court had no jurisdiction over the water
rights of the three Indian tribes. The district court, however, held that
the state courts had such jurisdiction under the McCarran Amendment,1 s and that the state court suit excluded an exercise of concurrent jurisdiction over a part of the San Juan system by a federal court.
While this case was pending on appeal, the Supreme Court held
that the McCarren Amendment did authorize the adjudication of In10. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
11. 601 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).

12. The Navajo River is a tributary of the San Juan; it begins in the mountains of southern Colorado, flows for a short distance through New Mexico, mostly on lands of the Jicarilla
Apache Reservation, then reenters Colorado and joins the San Juan. The San Juan in turn
flows through northwestern New Mexico and ultimately joins the Colorado River in Utah.
13. The state case sought adjudication of all New Mexico rights on the San Juan including those of three Indian tribes: Navajo, Ute Mountain Ute, and Jicarilla Apache. The United
States was joined in the action as a defendant both on its own behalf and as trustee on behalf of the three Indian tribes. Efforts by the United States to remove the case to federal
court or to have the case dismissed on grounds that the state court did not have jurisdiction
to determine the water rights of Indian tribes were unsuccessful. Reynolds v. United States,
No. 75-184 (San Juan Cty. Dist. Ct., N.M., filed __
, 1975).
14. In addition to its request for a general adjudication of water rights on the Navajo
River, the tribe also asked for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of the
Interior to prevent diversions of water from the Navajo River through the San Juan-Chama
Project in excess of amounts which could be beneficially used by parties in the Rio Grande
Basin. This aspect of the case was remanded for trial and is discussed in the text following
note 59 infra.
15. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976). The McCarran Amendment gives congressional consent
"to join the United States as a defendant in any suit for the adjudication of rights
to the use
of water."
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dian tribal water rights in state courts, in spite of the general lack of
state jurisdiction over Indian lands.' 6 Both the tribe and the United
States argued before the Tenth Circuit that the Supreme Court deciMexico
sion was not applicable to water rights adjudications in New
t" and the
Mexico,
New
for
Act
Enabling
1910
the
both
because
state's Constitution 1 8 contain a specific disclaimer by the state of
jurisdiction over Indian lands.' ' It was also argued that the general
terms of the McCarran Amendment are not sufficient to repeal the
terms of the disclaimers and to permit state court jurisdiction over
Indian property rights.2 0
The court of appeals rejected this argument. It held that there is
no conflict between state court jurisdiction over water rights, including water rights held for an Indian tribe, and the disclaimer provisions
because the McCarren Amendment clearly permits joinder of the
United States and because the United States is "the proper party to
protect all federally reserved water rights, including those set aside
for use by the Indian Tribes."'" The court held that the McCarren
Amendment implicitly modified the Enabling Act, vesting the state
courts with jurisdiction over Indian water rights held in trust by the
United States. The court therefore concluded that the state court had
jurisdiction over all rights in the San Juan River system and that the
tribe's complaint
federal court properly dismissed the portion of the
2
seeking separate adjudication of the Navajo River. 2
II. STATE JURISDICTION-TAXATION

Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey.I' In this case the court of
appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed the lower court holding that the
State of New Mexico had the power to impose its gross receipts tax
on contractors who had done construction work for the Mescalero
Apache Tribe on its reservation in southeastern New Mexico. The
court held that, under New Mexico law, the incidence of the gross receipts tax is on the contractor; therefore, the tax was not an impermissible levy on the tribe itself.
16. Colorado River Conservancy Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
17. 1910 N.M. Laws, ch. 310.
18. N.M. Const. art. 21, § 2.
19. These measures provide that Indian lands are to remain "under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States."
20. The McCarran Amendment does not specify whether the water adjudications to
which the United States can be joined are to be in state or federal court.
21. 601 F.2d at 1131 (emphasis in original).
22. The state court adjudication of the San Juan River, including water rights on the
Navajo River, is pending at this time.
23. 625 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1980).
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The court rejected the tribe's argument that the burden of the tax
was in fact on the tribe. The tribe had solicited bids from contractors
expressly requesting that the state tax not be included in the bid, but
the tribe agreed contractually to indemnify the contractors should
they be required to pay the state tax. The court indicated that it was
concerned only with the "legal incidence" of the tax, which was on
the contractors:
An indirect burden obviously is initially on the one for whom the
services are performed-thus on the Tribe or the Government. However, it is equally apparent that this indirect burden is again passed
on to the users of the resort and again by them. The tax becomes
disbursed. There is no way of telling where the ultimate economic
burden falls. This is the reason why the initial incidence of the tax
must be the determinative factor. It is the only significant matter for
our consideration. 24
In holding that the initial legal incidence of the tax was the only
significant consideration, the Tenth Circuit relied on its decision in
United States v. New Mexico. 2 ' The court of appeals decided in that
case that the State of New Mexico had the power to impose its gross
receipts tax on a contractor providing services to the federal government on federal lands. The court rejected the argument that the
actual burden of the tax was passed along immediately to the federal
government, which, of course, is immune from direct taxation by a
state.
In O'Cheskey the court noted that state laws may not be applied
on Indian reservations where they would "interfere with reservation
self-government or impair a right granted or reserved by federal
law.", 2 6 The court reasoned, however, that any interference posed by
the indirect burden of the state tax on the tribe was no different
than "all other costs, levies, and taxes on persons with whom [the
tribe does] business." ' 2 7 Strong dissents were registered by Judges
McKay and Doyle, largely on the ground that, by relying on the legal
incidence of the tax, the court ignored the fact that the actual burden
28
of the tax had to be absorbed by the tribe.
24. Id. at 970.
25. 581 F.2d 803 (10th Cir. 1978).
26. 625 F.2d at 970 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1972)).
27. 625 F.2d at 972.
28. Reasoning from the premise that the state could not tax tribal activities on the reservation directly, Judge Doyle argued that
the structure of the majority opinion, like the New Mexico statute, is purely
formal in that it ignores the fact that the burden comes to rest on the Tribe;
that the cost to the Tribe will necessarily be increased if the contractors are re-
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Shortly after this case was decided, the Supreme Court ruled in
2
favor of Indian tribes in two apparently similar cases. 9 In view of
these decisions the Mescalero Tribe moved for reconsideration of the
3 0 In
Tenth Circuit's O'Cheskey opinion, but the motion was denied.
denying the tribe's motion for rehearing, the Tenth Circuit stressed
that the two Supreme Court cases relied on the heavy involvement
of, and regulation by, the federal government in the activities sought
to be taxed: timber harvesting and sales of goods on the reservation.
The court distinguished these decisions on the ground that the basis
for preemption was considered fully in its original opinion and the
argument rejected. The court felt no new elements were added to the
analysis by the two decisions.
III. STATE JURISDICTION-WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT

Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico." 1 This case involved a
challenge by the tribe to the state's attempt to assert its jurisdiction
3
over hunting and fishing on the Mescalero reservation. 2 The district
court declared the state laws inapplicable within the reservation and
enjoined the state from attempting to enforce its game laws against
any persons, Indian or non-Indian, either within the reservation or
after they had left the reservation, for purported violations of state
law committed while within tribal boundaries. The state appealed
quired to pay the tax; that the program of the United States to develop tribal
independence would be impeded.
Id. at 975 (emphasis in original). Judges Doyle and McKay argued that the tax violated the
disclaimer of jurisdiction over Indian lands contained in N.M. Const. art. 21, § 2, and that
the tax was preempted by exclusive federal jurisdiction over the reservation. Both judges felt
that the tax was also a violation of the treaty between the Mescaleros (and other Apaches)
with the United States, Treaty of July 1, 1852, 10 Stat. 979 (1852), in which the Tribe submitted itself "to the laws, jurisdiction and government of the United States of America."
29. The Court held that Arizona cannot impose its motor carrier license and use fuel
taxes on a non-Indian contractor conducting timber operations on the White Mountain
Apache Reservation, White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 100 S. Ct. 2578 (1980), and
cannot levy a sales tax on a sale of farm machinery made to the Gila River tribe on its reservation. Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2592 (1980).
30. 625 F.2d at 991.
31. 630 F.2d 724 (1980).
32. The Mescalero Apache Tribe occupies a mountainous reservation in southern New
Mexico and in recent years the tribe has promoted an extensive tourism program designed to
create jobs and bring income to the reservation. As part of this program the tribe adopted
hunting and fishing ordinances in 1977 to improve wildlife management on the reservation.
A number of these ordinances are inconsistent with state laws. For example, the tribe does
not require hunters to obtain state hunting licenses and the hunting seasons and bag limits
differ. Shortly after the enactment of these ordinances, the state made clear its intention to
enforce its own fish and game laws on the reservation.
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and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court judgment for the
tribe. a
The court of appeals recognized that state laws are inapplicable
within Indian reservations "if the subject matter has been preempted
by federal law or if the state regulations infringe on the tribe's right
of self-government." '3 4 For purposes of the preemption analysis, the
court noted that the applicable treaty and federal statutes were to be
read against a "backdrop" of traditional tribal sovereignty over the
territory of the reservation.3 With respect to wildlife management,
the court observed, tribal sovereign powers are especially great. The
court of appeals agreed with the district court that before signing a
treaty with the United States3 6 the tribe "had inherent and complete authority to control any fish and game found within the confines of tribal territory."'3 This inherent tribal authority, the court
concluded, was never abrogated by federal law.
The Tenth Circuit emphasized that the tribe's authority to regulate
wildlife on its reservation was but one aspect of its inherent sovereign
power over its territory. In discussing tribal powers the court cited its
own recent decision in Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe,3 ' as well as
United States v. Mazurie3 9 and White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker.' 0 "In regulating game on the reservation," the court concluded, "the Tribe thus seeks to exercise its sovereign power in an
area in which it unquestionably has a 'significant interest.' "41 The
Tenth Circuit found that the tribe's inherent powers over reservation
fish and game, the 1852 Treaty, the federal statutes recognizing the
tribe's independence, and the Tribe's own constitution and wildlife
management ordinances preempted exercise by the State of inconsistent regulatory powers.
33. In this decision the Tenth Circuit joined the Fourth Circuit in refusing to follow a
recent contrary decision of the Ninth Circuit, which had held Montana fish and game laws
applicable to non-Indians hunting on an Indian reservation. Compare Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 588 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978)
with United States v. Sanford, 547 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1976). Unlike the Mescaleros, the
tribe involved in Sanford did not have an active wildlife management program of its own
with which the state laws might conflict.
34. 630 F.2d at 728 (quotingWhiteMountainApache Tribe v. Bracker, 100 S. Ct. 2578,
2583 (1980)).
35. See McClanahan v. Arizona StateTax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973); Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 690-91 (1965).
36. 10 Stat 979(1852).
37. 630 F.2d at 728-29.
38. 617 F.2d 537 (1980).
39. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
40. 100 S.Ct. 2578 (1980).
41. 630 F.2d at 730.
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The Tenth Circuit underscored the district court's finding that
neither the state nor its lands contributed in any significant way to
the creation and preservation of the reservation's wildlife. The district
court had found that the tribe's elk and antelope herds were almost
entirely the creation of the tribe, with assistance from the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. The court of appeals found no basis for the state's
management required overlapping
contention that effective 4wildlife
2
regulation.
tribal
state and
IV. STATE JURISDICTION-GARNISHMENT
Joe v. Marcum.4 3 The plaintiff in this case, a Navajo Indian, sought
an injunction in federal court against enforcement of a writ of garnishment issued by the magistrate court of San Juan County against
his wages earned at an open-pit mine on the Navajo reservation. The
plaintiff had borrowed money from a finance company in Farmington, which is off the reservation, and had defaulted on the loan. A
default judgment was entered against him in the magistrate court and
the writ of garnishment against his wages was issued to enforce the
judgment. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order enjoining the enforcement of the writ.
The court of appeals' decision rested on a determination that enwould imforcing a state court writ of garnishment on the reservation
4 " The court
self-government.
pinge upon the Navajo Tribe's right of
observed that the Navajo tribal government included a system of
courts and that the Navajo Code permitted enforcement of judgments
by execution on specific property. The Tribal Code does not, the
court noted, permit garnishment of wages. The wage garnishment
permitted by New Mexico law" would directly contradict the Navajo
42. The court of appeals distinguished recent decisions permitting states to impose gross
receipts taxes on sales by Indians or tribal businesses to non-Indians within Indian reservations. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 100 S. Ct.
2069 (1980); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 625 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1980). The
court noted that because the products taxed were not tribal creations, no special tribal interest was involved to preclude their taxation by the states. Moreover, the court concluded that
while "dual systems of pure taxation are not inherently conflicting," dual regulatory schemes
-including regulation of reservation wildlife-"necessarily create mutual dislocations." 630
F.2d at 730. The court relied on United States v. New Mexico, 590 F.2d 323, 328 (10th Cir.
1978) (holding the State powerless to enforce its liquor laws on the Mescalero reservation),
for the proposition that "regulatory powers in Indian country or on Indian lands belong to
the Congress except for inherent jurisdiction of the Tribes. Congress may delegate this
authority to the state, but when it does so it must be in specific terms." 630 F.2d at 730.
43. 621 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1980).
44. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
45. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 35-12-1 to -19 (1978).
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Tribe's policy decision not to permit such garnishment. Application
of the state law to permit garnishment of wages earned by a Navajo
Indian from employment on the reservation was thus held to be an
impermissible intrusion into the tribe's governmental powers.
V. TRIBAL TAXATION
Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe.4 6 This case was brought against
the Jicarilla Apache Tribe and its tribal council by energy companies
who held leases to produce oil and gas from wells within the tribe's
reservation. The tribe enacted an oil and gas severance tax on well
production within the reservation and the lessees brought a suit in
federal court to challenge the tax. The district court held the tax to
be illegal, unconstitutional, invalid, and void. The Tenth Circuit reversed on appeal.
The court of appeals held that the tribe's power of taxation within
its territorial jurisdiction was an attribute of sovereignty which it retained as an inherent power of self-government. 4 ' The court noted
decisions of the Supreme Court which had held that certain governmental powers of Indian tribes were surrendered because they were
inconsistent with "the superior interest of the United States." Examples include the inability of Indian tribes to convey their property
without approval of the United States 4 8 and the absence of tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations. 4 I The
court held, however, that the Jicarilla's oil and gas severance tax was
not inconsistent with any sovereign interest of the United States. The
court rejected arguments that the tax was a violation of due process
guaranteed the lessees under the fifth and fourteenth amendments or
that the tax violated a "national interest in free and open trade."' 0
The court noted that earlier decisions by both the Supreme Court 5 1
and the Eighth Circuit" 2 had upheld tribal taxes on non-members
doing business on the reservation.
The court of appeals also rejected arguments that the severance tax
violated the commerce clause of the Constitution. The court held
that the tax did not discriminate against interstate commerce because
46. 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3208 (No. 80-11, Oct. 7,

1980).

47. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), which emphasized that the governmental powers of Indian tribes are retained attributes of their aboriginal political sovereignty, rather than grants of the federal government.
48. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976).
49. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
50. 617 F.2d at 542.
51. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904).
52. Buster v. Wright, 135 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1905).
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it was "settled that an occupation or privilege tax on the mining or
severing of natural resources, although closely connected with interstate commerce, is a local activity properly subject to local taxation."' ' The court also rejected the argument that because New
Mexico has the authority to impose an identical tax on lessees, the
tribal tax was an improper burden on interstate commerce. A federal
statute5 4 permits severance taxes to be levied by states on production from Indian reservations created by executive order, such as the
Jicarilla Apache reservation, but the court refused to find that this
statute preempted similar taxes imposed by the Indians.
Finally, the court held that the lease terms, which provided that no
change could be made in the royalty rates without written consent of
both parties, did not preclude "a sovereign that is also a lessor from
imposing a tax which has the practical effect of increasing its revenues."5 I The court noted that "it is well settled that such an agreement does not prevent the exaction of a license tax 'unless this right
has been specifically surrendered in terms which admit of no other
reasonable interpretation.' "I 6
VI. OIL AND GAS LAW

JicarillaApache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp. 7 This case was filed
in 1975 by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe against several energy companies
holding oil and gas leases on the Jicarilla reservation in northwestern
New Mexico. The complaint alleged various antitrust violations by
the companies and also sought damages and an accounting for alleged
breaches of the leases. The Secretary of the Interior also was named
as a party defendant and charged with failing to carry out his trust
obligations to supervise these oil and gas leases. Several of the companies reached a settlement with the tribe but the tribe's claims
against the remaining companies were tried in May and June of 1979.
The leases in question were held primarily for the production of
53. 617 F.2d at 545 (citing Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923)).
54. 25 U.S.C. § 398(c) (1976).
55. 617 F.2d at 549.
56. Id. (quoting City of St. Louisv. United Rys., 210 U.S. 266, 280 (1908)). The Tenth
Circuit's recognition in this decision of tribal power to tax business transactions with nonIndians occurring on a reservation was subsequently confirmed in another case by the Supreme Court. In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 100
S. Ct. 2069 (1980), the court upheld the power of Indian tribes to impose a tax on nontribal
purchasers of cigarettes on their reservations. In an analysis similar to that of the Tenth Cirhe power to tax transactions occurring on trust
cuit in Merrion, the Court observed that "[t]
lands and significantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of
their dependent status." Id. at 2081.
57. 479 F. Supp. 536 (D.N.M. 1979).
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natural gas. The gas produced, however, was also processed through a
gasoline extraction plant; the tribe's first antitrust claim was that
Supron had monopolized the market in the San Juan Basin for liquid
hydrocarbons processed from the gas produced on the reservation.
The district court held against the tribe on this claim on a factual
finding that Supron had never marketed more than 50% of the liquid
hydrocarbons sold in the basin.
The court also rejected the tribe's claim that the companies had
entered into a conspiracy to fix prices and to limit development of
their gas leases. The court noted that while development decisions
were conservative, they appeared to have been based on sound business considerations. The prices set in the various gas leases were found
to "reflect not illegal conspiracies, but rather the considered judgment of the parties to these contracts that such prevailing terms and
prices, at the time these contracts were consummated, were fair and
reasonable to all parties." ' 8 The court also noted that the presence
of "favored nation clauses" in the gas purchase contracts were incompatible with the allegation of conspiracy to fix prices.' '
The court did hold that the defendant energy companies technically had violated section 8 of the Clayton Antitrust Act 6 0 because,
at times, they shared at least one common director. However, since
the court had found that there was no substantive violation of the
antitrust laws, this violation caused no injury to the tribe and damages were inappropriate. 6 1
The tribe also alleged a number of common law claims against the
defendant energy companies for breach of the terms of their leases.
The tribe claimed that the lessees failed to develop their leases diligently, that they failed to drill off-set wells to protect the leases from
drainage, and that they failed to account for royalties accurately. The
tribe also alleged that the Secretary of the Interior failed to require
the lessees to perform their lease obligations.
On the issue of diligent development, the court noted the principle
of law that "a lessee must continue to develop a lease if there is an
expectation of finding gas without undue risk as well as an expectation of a payout within a reasonable time." 6 2 Applying this principle
to the facts presented at trial, the court rejected the tribe's claim of
lack of diligence. The price of gas increased dramatically since 1975
58. Id. at 542.
59. These clauses provided that the selling price would be escalated to the same level as
higher prices received by other sellers as a result of subsequent purchase contracts.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976).
61. The tribe did not seek injunctive relief for the section 8 violations.
62. 479 F. Supp. at 545.
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and in earlier years the additional wells proposed by plaintiffs experts were not economical, even though they have become so today.
In addition, "because of the dramatic rise in gas prices, future production of the reserves remaining under these leases will produce royalties to the tribe far in excess of royalties which would have accrued
had the leases been more fully developed earlier." 6 3
Notwithstanding the court's finding that the leases were developed
diligently over the years, it went on to hold that the Secretary of the
Interior had failed to fulfill his duty to insure such development. In
response to the lawsuit, the Interior Department began to supervise
development of these leases more closely. The court, however, held
that this supervision had come too late and that diligent development
of the leases was "fortuitous and did not result from timely action
'
taken by the Secretary.

64

Only on the question of proper accounting for royalties did the
tribe prevail against the energy companies. This success came in the
form of another judgment against the Secretary of the Interior. The
tribe's leases with the producers, executed on a standard Bureau of
Indian Affairs form, provided that the tribe's royalty would be based
on the value of the gas produced. The lease provided that value might
be determined for purposes of computing the royalty either on the
value of the gas as produced at the wellhead or by the value of the
products produced from the gas at an extraction plant. The lease said
that "the actual amount realized by the lessee from the sale of [the
be deemed mere
natural gas] may, in the discretion of the Secretary,
6
evidence of or conclusive evidence of such value." 1
The Secretary had, in fact, for many years used the sales price of
the gas realized by the producer-lessees as the basis for determining
value and for computing royalties. Based on these lease provisions,
the court granted a motion for summary judgment, holding that the
Secretary was properly within his discretion in basing royalties on
actual sales prices at the wellhead. The court reversed this ruling after
trial.
The court noted that both the lease and the governing regulations
provided two different methods for determining the value of the gas
for royalty purposes. Royalties were to be computed on the higher of
two values: sales price of the gas at the wellhead, or the value of the
products from the gas after processing ("BTU-adjusted sales price" v.
63. Id. at 546. Similarly, with respect to the development of off-set wells to protect
drainage from lease lands, the court held that, on the facts established at trial, no off-set
wells had been required.
64. Id. at 547.
65. Id. at 549.
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"net realization"). The court found that the Secretary had breached
his fiduciary duties to the tribe by failing to require an accounting by
the companies in both forms so a comparison could be made to determine which method resulted in the higher value of gas produced from
the reservation. The court accordingly ordered the Secretary to require that the companies make an accounting by the "dual account6
ing method" for the years 1970 to the present. 6
VII. WATER RIGHTS
JicarillaApache Tribe v. United States. 6 1 In the lawsuit discussed
previously, 6 8 the Jicarilla Apache Tribe also sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against the United States and the Secretary of the Interior to prevent allegedly improper diversions of water from the
Navajo River above the tribe's reservation through the San JuanChama Project. 69 This aspect of the case was remanded to the district
court by the court of appeals.
The tribe's suit against the Secretary sought an injunction against
diversions of water being made through the project in excess of
amounts which could be used beneficially by contracting parties.7 0
The tribe alleged that its fishing on the Navajo River within the reservation was damaged by these "excess" diversions.
The issue on remand focused on the disposition of "San JuanChama Project Water" committed to the City of Albuquerque under
its contract with the Bureau of Reclamation. Under the contract
terms, the City of Albuquerque is entitled to receive slightly less than
50,000 acre-feet of water each year from the project and is committed
to a repayment schedule which averages almost one million dollars
66. Id. at 553. This accounting has been made and furnished to the court and is now
under review.
67. No. 75-742-P (D.N.M., filed May 8, 1980).
68. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 601 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 995 (1979). See text accompanying notes 11-22 supra.
69. The San Juan-Chama Project was authorized by Congress in 1962, Pub. L. 87-483,
§ 8, 76 Stat. 97 (1962), and construction was completed by 1970. The project consists of a
series of diversion works and tunnels in Colorado designed to divert water from tributaries
of the San Juan River and transport it for use in the Rio Grande Basin in New Mexico. Two
of the three diversion points are on the Navajo River upstream from the Jicarilla Apache
Reservation. Significant portions of the Navajo River flow have been diverted for use in the
Rio Grande Basin since operations commenced in 1971. The San Juan-Chama Project is operated by the Water and Power Resources Service, formerly the Bureau of Reclamation, of
the Department of the Interior.
70. Water is made available in the Rio Grande Basin to parties holding contracts with
the Secretary of the Interior. The contracts require that the water users help repay a portion
of the construction costs of the project as well as an annual charge for operation and maintenance. The contracting parties are irrigation districts on the Rio Grande and municipalities
such as Albuquerque, Santa Fe, and Los Alamos within the Rio Grande Basin.
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per year. At the present time, however, the City does not need any
of the project water for municipal use. In fact, the full 50,000 acrefeet may not be needed until some time in the next century. In the
meantime the City has sought to make interim uses of the project
water, including selling it to other parties such as irrigation districts,
storing it in reservoirs for future use, and putting it to recreational
use. It tried to store the water in the Elephant Butte Reservoir, which
is operated by the Water and Power Resources Service. A contract
permitting the storage was negotiated with the Secretary of the Interior, but the tribe challenged it on the ground that the storage
would involve excessive waste of the water because of evaporation
from the Reservoir. The tribe also charged that the storage was not
permitted by the terms of the San Juan-Chama Act, and that the City
was required to obtain a permit authorizing the storage from the
State Engineer.
After the trial, the district court entered a judgment which largely
favored the position urged by the tribe. The court ruled that, notwithstanding the evaporation of water from Elephant Butte Reservoir, the storage of the City's San Juan-Chama water did constitute a
"beneficial use" because of the recreation activities at the Reservoir
7
that would be enhanced by the storage of additional water . 1 The
court added that storage of water for recreation and fishing purposes
was recognized as a beneficial use under New Mexico water law. On
the issues of state and federal authority for this storage, however, the
court ruled for the tribe.
The court held that neither the legislative history of the San Juanstorage of the
Chama Project Act nor its specific terms authorized
7 2 The plans for the
City's project water in Elephant Butte Reservoir.
San Juan-Chama Project were set out in Bureau of Reclamation documents prepared in the 1950's. The planners contemplated that the
City of Albuquerque would be a major user of the San Juan-Chama
Project water, but they recognized that the City would not require its
full 50,000 acre-feet for thirty or more years after completion of the
project. The documents specifically noted that the City would be free
to sell its excess water during the interim period. In a rare instance of
inter-governmental unanimity the United States, the State Engineer,
and the City of Albuquerque all argued that this provision in the reclamation plans should be interpreted broadly to allow the City to
make reasonable beneficial use of its excess project water until the
full supply was needed for its municipal system, including a use such
71. No. 75-742-P (D.N.M., filed May 8, 1980).
72. Id. at _.
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as storage in Elephant Butte Reservoir for recreational purposes, resales to other water users, or storage for future municipal needs. The
district court held, however, that while resale of the City's water was
authorized, storage in Elephant Butte was not because it was not specifically contemplated in the reclamation plans. 3 The City's contract
with the Secretary for the storage, therefore, was held invalid.
VIII. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

United States v. Pino. " The defendant was convicted in federal
court of involuntary manslaughter by automobile while within "In76
dian country." ' The defendant, relying on Keeble v. United States,
appealed his conviction on grounds that the trial court should have
given an instruction on careless driving, based on a New Mexico statute, 7 as a lesser included offense to the involuntary manslaughter
charge.
The government attempted to distinguish Keeble on appeal to the
Tenth Circuit by noting that the lesser offense involved in Keeble,
simple assault, was itself a federal crime 7 8 when it occurred within
the "special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States,"
including Indian reservations. 7 9 The government pointed out that
careless driving was not a specific federal crime no matter where
committed.
The court of appeals rejected the government's argument, ruling
that the state crime of careless driving was also a crime when com80
mitted by an Indian on an Indian reservation under a federal statute.
A companion statute extends state criminal laws to areas "reserved or
acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction thereof. ' 8 1 The court of appeals, following
Williams v. United States, 2 held Indian reservations to be such areas.
73. Id. at __
.
74. 606 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1979).
75. "Indian country" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976), to include, interalia, "all
land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government."
76. 412 U.S. 205 (1972). In Keeble, an Indian defendant was charged under the Major
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § § 1153, 3242 (1976), with assault to commit serious bodily injury
resulting in death on an Indian reservation. The trial court refused to give a lesser included
offense instruction on simple assault, but the Supreme Court held that such an instruction
should have been given. The Court held that the Major Crimes Act should not be interpreted
to deprive Indian defendants of procedural rights granted to other defendants, such as the
right to a lesser included offense charge.
77. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-114 (1978).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 113 (1976).
79. 606 F.2d at 915.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) (1976).
82. 327 U.S. 711 (1945).

